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COUNTERING THE NEW ELECTION SUBVERSION: THE
DEMOCRACY PRINCIPLE AND THE ROLE OF STATE
COURTS
JESSICA BULMAN-POZEN & MIRIAM SEIFTER*
Among the threats to American democracy, the most serious may also
be the most banal: future elections will be compromised by quiet changes to
the law. State legislators across the country have introduced bills that give
them power to reject the will of voters. They have established sham audits
and investigations. And they have created new criminal offenses that
undermine professional election administration. While power-shifting
legislation, audits, and criminal penalties advertise their fealty to law, they
threaten the franchise and electoral integrity, as well as nonpartisan, expert
election administration. Because of its ostensibly legal, even legalistic,
character, however, the new election subversion complicates ordinary judicial
countermand. Federal courts, in particular, have foreclosed many of their
own means of responding to such measures.
This essay, written for the University of Wisconsin Law School
Symposium on Interpretation in the States, describes why state courts are well
situated to counter the new election subversion. Building on our prior work
exploring the democracy principle in state constitutions, we explain how the
text, structure, and history of states’ founding documents privilege popular
sovereignty, majority rule, and political equality. After canvassing emerging
threats to elections across the country, we explain how state courts might
apply the democracy principle to address the new election subversion.
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INTRODUCTION
Among the threats to American democracy, the most serious may
also be the most banal: future elections will be compromised not by
violence but by state officials quietly changing the law.1 In statehouses
across the country, legislators have proposed, and in some cases, passed
bills that give them power to suppress or reject the will of the people.2
They have assigned themselves roles previously granted to election
administrators. They have established sham audits and investigations.
And they have introduced new criminal offenses that undermine
professional election administration.
For many watching these subnational developments, they augur a
frightening fait accompli. Legal challenges following the 2020 election
were clownish efforts.3 But those challenges provided a roadmap for the
state-level legal changes we see now.4 In future elections, election
subversion may be—at least superficially—lawful. It may come from new
state laws rather than challenges to them, and from enforcement of legal
provisions rather than objections to them.
In one account of how this ends, courts will have nothing to do but
bless these antidemocratic acts. Precisely because of its ostensibly legal,
even legalistic, character, the new election subversion complicates
1.
See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Trump’s Next Coup Has Already Begun,
ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/01/january-6insurrection-trump-coup-2024-election/620843/ [https://perma.cc/M6PC-6ECC] (Dec.
9, 2021, 3:21 PM); see also Richard L. Hasen, Identifying and Minimizing the Risk of
Election Subversion and Stolen Elections in the Contemporary United States, 135 HARV.
L. REV. F. 265, 284 (2022) (“By far the most likely way in which election subversion
would infect United States elections in the near term is through a respectable bloodless
coup dependent upon technical legal arguments overcoming valid election results.”).
2.
See, e.g., STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CTR., PROTECT DEMOCRACY & L.
FORWARD, A DEMOCRACY CRISIS IN THE MAKING: HOW STATE LEGISLATURES ARE
POLITICIZING, CRIMINALIZING, AND INTERFERING WITH ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
(2022),
https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/05/DCITM_2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWZ2-W4UC]; Voting
Laws Roundup: May 2022, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 26, 2022),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-may2022 [https://perma.cc/RW5U-NXZC].
3.
E.g., Hasen, supra note 1, at 268–73.
4.
See Julie Novkov, Donald Trump, Constitutional Failure, and the
Guardrails of Democracy, 81 MD. L. REV. 276, 289 (2021) (“The failure of the lawsuits,
rather than undermining the narrative, fueled a wave of Republican-initiated state
legislative proposals to limit or claw back broader ballot access initiatives undertaken
during the 2020 election.”).
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ordinary judicial countermand. As scholars have noted in related
contexts, power-grabs and sabotage that operate through the law present
special challenges for courts.5 And the problem is acute when it comes
to state manipulation of federal elections. Federal courts have foreclosed
many of their own means of halting democratic decline, and the Supreme
Court seems to be seriously entertaining outlandish theories that would
insulate state legislatures’ manipulations from challenge.6
Although commentators are right to worry, discussions of judicial
review too often overlook the distinctive role of state courts. Well before
the moment of election tabulations, state courts have the authority—and
duty—to preserve democracy’s basic functioning. As we have described
in prior work, state constitutions espouse a democracy principle that
commits states to political equality, popular sovereignty, and majority
rule.7 And as we explain in this Essay, state court application of the
democracy principle can mitigate several impending threats to elections,
including direct attempts to overturn election results, as well as efforts to
degrade the integrity of elections through bogus audits and harassment of
election personnel. State courts alone cannot save American democracy,
but they can extinguish smaller fires and diminish the risk of a massive
conflagration in 2024. While diverse efforts at reform remain critical at
federal, state, and local levels alike, we neglect the role of state courts at
our peril.8
Part I of the Essay offers a primer on the democracy principle,
including new case law that underscores the principle’s import and
relevance. Part II explores the principle’s application to a variety of
election-related threats. We conclude with cautious optimism about the
state judicial role in times of democratic vulnerability.

5.
Perhaps the closest cousin to the electoral subversion we explore here is
“autocratic legalism” as diagnosed by Kim Lane Scheppele: officials with antidemocratic
designs “creat[e] new law as a way of consolidating political power.” Kim Lane
Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 548 & n.7 (2018); cf. Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 816–
24 (2015) (analyzing subversive law-following as a strategy of resistance).
6.
See, e.g., Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 2901 (2022) (granting certiorari);
Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1 (2020) (statement of Alito, J.);
Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 732–33 (2021) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 46–47 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief); Democratic
Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28–29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in denial of vacatur of stay).
7.
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in
State Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859 (2021).
8.
See Miriam Seifter, State Institutions and Democratic Opportunity, 72
DUKE
L.J.
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
4–9),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4042959.
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2. THE DEMOCRACY PRINCIPLE IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A
PRIMER

State constitutions are powerfully committed to democracy. As we
have explained at length in prior writing, the text, structure, and history
of these foundational documents privilege popular sovereignty, majority
rule, and political equality.9 In this shared commitment to what we term
the democracy principle, state constitutions depart from their federal
counterpart. While the federal constitution contains no channels for direct
self-rule, state constitutions embrace active popular sovereignty.10 While
the federal constitution thwarts majoritarian governance and empowers
political minorities, state constitutions insist on rule by popular
majorities.11 And while the federal constitution undermines political
equality because of the very system of federalism, state constitutions
powerfully endorse equal access to political institutions by members of
the political community as well as equal treatment of these individuals
by political institutions.12 These differences render democracy central to
the project of state constitutional interpretation—and they make state
constitutions a critical resource in protecting and advancing American
democracy.

A. Pillars and Origins
The democracy principle is an animating feature of all fifty state
constitutions.13 These constitutions embrace popular sovereignty,
majority rule, and political equality in their ample text as well as their
structure and historical development. Indeed, the common practice of
amending has instantiated popular majority rule at the same time as it has
further inscribed democratic commitments into state constitutions.
First, popular sovereignty is the cornerstone of state constitutions.
From the start, these constitutions proclaimed that all government power
comes from the people, and they have regularly expanded channels for
unmediated expressions of the popular will. Forty-nine state constitutions
include an express commitment to popular sovereignty in operative
9.

This Part draws on our longer article, The Democracy Principle in State

Constitutions. Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7.
10.
Id. at 879–82.
11.
Id. at 887–89.
12.
See id. at 890–94.

13.
We recognize that the fifty state constitutions are different—adopted and
amended by different political communities at different moments—but nonetheless believe
both that the democracy principle is a shared constitutional commitment and that there is
value in understanding it as a trans-state principle without denying the need for statespecific context and nuance. For more on our interpretive approach and the question of
many states, see id. at 865–69.
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provisions, rather than merely aspirational preambles, most commonly
stating that “all political power is inherent in the people.”14 These
constitutions also guarantee the people’s right to alter or abolish the
constitutions they have created and insist that government exists to serve
the people.15 Consistent with such textual commitments, the people have
repeatedly and significantly amended state constitutions. Most states have
held multiple constitutional conventions, and state constitutions have
collectively been amended more than 7,500 times.16
Further embodying a commitment to popular sovereignty, every
state constitution confers the right to vote,17 and a majority declare that
elections shall be “free,” “free and equal,” or “free and open.”18 These
constitutions also provide for the people to fill most government offices—
including governor and numerous other executive offices as well as
judges—through popular statewide vote.19 Over time, state constitutional
amendments have particularly reflected a concern about the inadequacy
of legislative representation. Although the first state constitutions treated
the legislature as the closest approximation of the people, numerous
nineteenth- and twentieth-century amendments have been “primarily
concerned with preventing faithless legislators from frustrating the
popular will.”20 From term limits to detailed procedural requirements,
state constitutions constrain legislative power to ensure greater popular
accountability.21 They also seek to enhance connections between the
people and other government actors, including governors and judges, as
a check on the legislature.22
To elevate the people above their legislative representatives, state
constitutions have likewise been amended to provide opportunities for
direct popular lawmaking. In the early twentieth century, approximately
half of the states adopted the initiative or referendum.23 Today, direct
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 869–70 & nn.48–51 (collecting constitutional provisions).
Id. at 870 & nn.52–54 (collecting constitutional provisions).

JOHN DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY
AMENDMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES 19–21, 23 (2018).
17.
Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 870–71 & nn.55–58 (collecting
constitutional provisions).
18.
Id. at 871 & n.59 (collecting constitutional provisions).
19.
Id. at 872–73 & nn.62–66 (collecting constitutional provisions).
20.
G. Alan Tarr, For the People: Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional
Tradition, in DEMOCRACY: HOW DIRECT?: VIEWS FROM THE FOUNDING ERA AND THE
POLLING ERA 87, 94 (Elliott Abrams ed., 2002).
21.
See, e.g., ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 258 (2009); EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG
PLACES 33 (2013); Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 874–75 & nn.74–79
(collecting constitutional provisions); Tarr, supra note 20, at 94.
22.
Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 885–86.
23.
JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 94
(2006).
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democracy permeates state constitutions in the form of provisions for
constitutional or statutory initiative, legislative or popular referendum,
recall, and constitutional convention.24 Such clauses generally indicate
that they withhold power from state legislatures and retain it for the
people.25 In provisions for direct democracy and accountable
representative democracy alike, then, state constitutions insist that the
people remain sovereign and the government must be accountable to
them.
Second, and closely related to the commitment to popular
sovereignty, state constitutions understand the people as a body that
governs through majority rule. From their earliest incarnations, some
state constitutions have expressly recognized “a majority of the
community” as the source of government power.26 And through
amendments over time—including an early slew of entirely new
constitutions adopted through majoritarian proceedings outside of
constitutionally specified processes27—state constitutions have
increasingly provided for popular majorities to ratify popular
amendments, adopt initiatives and referenda, and choose
representatives.28
Today, the many state executive officials who are elected—from
governors and lieutenant governors to attorneys general, secretaries of
state, treasurers, and more—are chosen by statewide majorities; state
constitutions include nothing akin to the federal Electoral College to
constrain popular majorities.29 So too, states with initiatives and
referenda generally provide that approval is to be by majority vote.30
Constitutional amendment and recall provisions likewise contemplate
action by popular statewide majorities.31 And within the government
bodies they establish, state constitutions provide for majority voting rules
24.
Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 876–79 & nn.85–106 (collecting
constitutional provisions).
25.
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1 (“The legislative authority of
the state shall be vested in the legislature . . . but the people reserve the power to propose
laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject such laws and amendments
at the polls, independently of the legislature . . . .”); Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note
7, at 877 & n.91 (collecting constitutional provisions). These provisions also deny
gubernatorial power to veto initiative measures approved by the people. See BulmanPozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 877 n.92 (collecting constitutional provisions).
26.
E.g., VA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rts., art. 3. When the connection
was not explicit, it “went without saying in a variety of declarations precisely because it
was so obvious.” Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 482 (1994).
27.
See, e.g., CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS 30–31 (2008).
28.
See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 888–89.
29.
See id. at 872 & nn.62–64 (collecting constitutional provisions).
30.
See id. at 876–77 & nn.90 & 96 (collecting constitutional provisions).
31.
See id. at 878–79 & nn.102 & 105 (collecting constitutional provisions).
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and impose limits on minoritarian power.32 With respect to constitutional
adoption and amendment, as well as both direct democracy and elections
for representatives, state constitutions treat the majority as the best
approximation of the people and indicate that the preference of the
majority is to prevail in the face of political disagreement.
Third, state constitutions embrace a distinctive vision of political
equality that informs democratic commitments to popular sovereignty
and majority rule. These constitutions propose that all members of the
political community share in the power to influence government, and, in
turn, they seek to foreclose forms of special treatment by government.
One of the principal fears that has animated state constitutional
provisions over time is “minority faction, not majority faction”—a
concern that the privileged few might capture government at the expense
of the many.33 From the start, numerous state constitutions accordingly
insisted on equality among the limited group of people understood to
constitute the political community.34 Those limits were severe, and later
periods of retrenchment have sharply underscored the ways in which an
abstract commitment to political equality has not effectively guaranteed
equality to people of color, women, and others. Yet the articulation of
political equality as an ideal has underwritten more inclusive
understandings. Today, the state constitutional commitment to political
equality appears most clearly in the provisions, contained in some form
in every state constitution, that broadly guarantee the right to vote and to
participate in free and fair elections.35
The state constitutional commitment to political equality is also
pronounced in provisions requiring the government to work for the good
of the whole and not for particular segments of the population. Some
early constitutions expressly included common-good guarantees and
prohibitions on special treatment,36 and these commitments grew more
common across the nineteenth century as state constitutional conventions
adopted limitations on legislative favoritism, as well as equality
guarantees and public purpose requirements.37 Today, most state
constitutions limit special legislation and seek to foreclose other forms of
favoritism by the government.38

32.
Id. at 875.
33.
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 78 (1998).
34.
See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 890 & nn.178–80 (collecting
examples from early declarations of rights).
35.
See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
36.
Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 892.
37.
Id. at 892–94.
38.
See id. at 875 & n.80 (collecting constitutional provisions).
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B. Recent Developments

Although the democracy principle is a longstanding commitment of
state constitutions, it has been urgently invoked in recent years as
challenges to partisan gerrymandering and other electoral mischief have
been pushed out of federal I to state courts.39 The attendant litigation
looks different in each state and, as is appropriate for a shorthand
formulation, does not rely on the “democracy principle” as such but
rather on state-specific constitutional text, history, and doctrine. But
while such diversity is both salutary and inevitable, considering together
the cases that treat democracy as a state-level constitutional concept
illuminates more than it obscures. State courts are correct to consider a
shared state commitment to democracy as they interpret and implement
their particular constitutions.40
As litigation challenging partisan gerrymanders unfolds across the
country,41 for instance, judicial opinions and briefs have been further
elaborating the democracy principle. In North Carolina, the state
supreme court recently invalidated a partisan gerrymander by the state
legislature.42 Describing the “fundamental right to vote” in terms that
reflect the democracy principle’s commitment to popular sovereignty,
majority rule, and political equality, the court stated: “The fundamental
right to vote includes the right to enjoy ‘substantially equal voting power
and substantially equal legislative representation.’ The right to equal
power encompasses the opportunity to aggregate one’s vote with
likeminded citizens to elect a governing majority of elected officials who
reflect those citizens’ views.”43
39.
See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019)
(holding that partisan gerrymandering is not justiciable under the federal Constitution).
40.
See, e.g., N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Moore, 876 S.E.2d 513,
528 & n.5 (N.C. 2022) (recognizing that principles of popular sovereignty and
democratic self-rule “are not unique to North Carolina’s Constitution”) (citing BulmanPozen & Seifter, supra note 7); see also, e.g., Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 407
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (looking to interpretations of election protections in “[o]ther states
with similar constitutional provisions”); Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 910–
16 (discussing partisan gerrymandering litigation).
41.
See generally Redistricting Litigation Roundup, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/redistricting-litigationroundup-0 [https://perma.cc/9GNA-RL2S] (Sept. 14, 2022) (compiling cases challenging
racially discriminatory and partisan gerrymanders).
42.
Harper v. Hall, 868 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022).
43.
Id. at 546 (citation omitted); see also id. at 546–47 (“When, on the basis
of partisanship, the General Assembly enacts a districting plan that diminishes or dilutes
a voter’s opportunity to aggregate with likeminded voters to elect a governing majority—
that is, when a districting plan systematically makes it harder for individuals because of
their party affiliation to elect a governing majority than individuals in a favored party of
equal size—the General Assembly deprives on the basis of partisan affiliation a voter of
his or her right to equal voting power.”).
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The supreme courts of Ohio and New York have also recently
invalidated partisan gerrymanders. In both states, after the 2010 cycle of
redistricting, voters adopted constitutional amendments seeking to stem
partisan manipulation. Ohioans prohibited their state legislature from
adopting a plan that “unduly favors or disfavors a political party or its
incumbents” or that “unduly split[s] governmental units.”44 New Yorkers
provided for an independent redistricting commission to draw maps and
prohibited the formation of districts to “discourage competition or for the
purpose of favoring or disfavoring incumbents or other particular
candidates or political parties.”45 In both states, these processes of
constitutional amendment themselves reflected the democracy principle:
popular majorities altered state constitutions in a manner that underscored
the people’s authority and sought to limit unrepresentative, self-interested
legislative activity. And state courts relied on these amendments, with a
nod to the underlying democratic principles, to invalidate state legislative
maps.46
The democracy principle has also informed other important
litigation. In a recent decision concerning the aftermath of a racial
gerrymander, for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court limited
the power of an unconstitutionally gerrymandered legislature to initiate
amendments to the state constitution.47 Recognizing “popular sovereignty
and democratic self-rule” as “the beating heart of North Carolina’s
system of government,” the court held that an unconstitutionally
composed legislature should not be able to entrench its power, insulate
itself from political accountability, or discriminate against those groups
that had been shut out of the representative process.48 If such legislators
had unreviewable authority to initiate constitutional amendments, the

44.
OHIO CONST. art. XIX, § 1(C)(3).
45.
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4(c).
46.
See, e.g., Adams v. DeWine, Nos. 2021-1428 & 2021-1449, 2022 WL
129092, at *1 (Ohio Jan. 14, 2022) (invalidating Ohio’s gerrymander by stating, “[i]n
our representative democracy, the power rests at all times with the people. Their power
is never more profound than when it is expressed through their vote at the ballot box”);
Harkenrider v. Hochul, No. 60, 2022 WL 1236822, at *10 (N.Y. Apr. 27, 2022)
(invoking “the most fundamental of all democratic principles—that the ‘voters should
choose their representatives, not the other way around’”) (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138
S. Ct. 1916, 1940 (2018)). We recognize, but do not explore here, the more complicated
normative picture the New York ruling raises given the national prevalence of Republican
gerrymanders. See Aaron Goldzimer & Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Novel Strategy
Blue States Can Use to Solve Partisan Gerrymandering by 2024, SLATE (May 6, 2022,
2:41 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/05/new-york-democrats-partisangerrymandering-2024.html [https://perma.cc/KUB7-L2LH] (observing that “[a] fairer
New York map will result in greater unfairness at the national level” and recommending
“[b]lue state redistricting based on national partisan fairness”).
47.
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Moore, 876 S.E.2d 513 (N.C. 2022).
48.
Id. at 527.
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court reasoned, “the fundamental principle that all political power resides
with and flows from the people of North Carolina would be threatened.”49
Another notable contribution to the democracy principle’s
articulation comes from an Idaho case concerning initiative and
referendum rights. In 1912, Idahoans adopted a constitutional
amendment in which the “people reserve[d] to themselves” the powers
to approve or reject legislation as well as to propose and enact laws
directly, but the state legislature has repeatedly attempted to make these
initiative and referendum processes more onerous.50 After a successful
Medicaid Expansion ballot initiative in 2018, the legislature dramatically
increased the geographic distribution requirement for signatures required
to qualify an initiative or referendum for the ballot and delayed the
effective date of passed initiatives so that the legislature would have time
to repeal or amend them before they ever took effect.51 The Idaho
Supreme Court invalidated these provisions as unjustified encroachments
on the fundamental rights of initiative and referendum.52
Much of the opinion engages in a close textual reading of the state
constitution’s initiative and referenda provisions, but the court also
offered a robust response to several antidemocratic arguments advanced
by the state legislature. After beginning its analysis with reminders that
under the Idaho Constitution “[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people”53 and that the government was instituted to do the people’s will,
the court placed the legislation in its “historical context[,] . . . which
shows an unmistakable pattern by the legislature of constricting the
people’s initiative and referendum powers after they successfully use
[them].”54
The court readily saw through the legislature’s faux solicitude for
minority interests and majority support. First, the legislature argued that
its requirements were “necessary to prevent the minority from being
‘trammeled by the majority,’” but the court noted both that the legislature
had identified no threat to minority interests and that, in fact, the state’s
most recent referenda and initiatives were better understood as “examples
of the majority of Idaho voters acting in a democratic fashion to protect
minority interests (educators and the poor) when the Idaho Legislature
would not.”55 Second, rejecting the legislature’s argument that its
requirements would ensure sufficient statewide support, the court
49.
Id. at 519.
50.
Reclaim Idaho v. Denney, 497 P.3d 160, 167–69 (Idaho 2021) (describing
legislature’s failure to pass enabling legislation, decisions to increase signature
requirements, and the like over the course of a century).
51.
Id. at 169.
52.
Id. at 180–81.
53.
Id. at 180 (quoting IDAHO CONST. art I, § 2).
54.
Id. at 186.
55.
Id. at 186–87.
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responded that protection against provincialism was provided by the
requirement that any qualifying initiatives or referenda be adopted by a
subsequent majority vote.56 Vindicating the constitutional right of the
people of Idaho to engage in popular self-governance, the court was
neither fooled nor long detained by the legislature’s inversions of
democratic principles. Its clear-eyed, careful opinion offers guidance for
reviewing the electoral threats to which we now turn.
II. STATE COURTS AND THREATS TO AMERICAN ELECTIONS
Today, state legislatures across the country are proposing new laws
that would undermine free and fair elections. Outside of the legislative
process, officials and others pursuing antidemocratic theories have told
bold lies, initiated sham investigations, and harassed election officials.
These measures are of a piece with Samuel Issacharoff’s observation that
the “gravest threat to our democracy” lies in movement towards
“[w]eaponizing the electoral system,” including by “solidify[ing] party
control of election mechanisms” and “turning the ordinary task of
tabulating election results into an opportunity for partisan mischief.”57
Some of the new election subversion is brazen in its lawlessness.
For instance, although the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated its partisan
gerrymander in January,58 the Ohio Redistricting Commission repeatedly
defied court orders concerning the content of districting plans and the
process of adopting them.59 In Arizona, the infamous “Cyber Ninjas”
audit pursued baseless ideas (like searching ballots for bamboo fibers
based on a conspiracy theory that the ballots were smuggled from Asia)60
by flouting standard audit protocols involving security and chain of
custody. The company’s violations of state public records laws, and then
of court orders, led to a contempt order fine of $50,000 per day.61
56.
Id. at 190.
57.
Samuel Issacharoff, Weaponizing the Electoral System, 74 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 28, 28 (2022).
58.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59.
See, e.g., Republican-Controlled Ohio Redistricting Commission Refuses
Supreme Court Order to Draft Constitutional Maps a Sixth Time, OHIO HOUSE OF REPS.
(June 3, 2022), https://www.ohiohouse.gov/news/democrat/republican-controlled-ohioredistricting-commission-refuses-supreme-court-order-to-draft-constitutional-maps-asixth-time-110329 [https://perma.cc/CS3U-CW2G].
60.
See Michael Waldman, Hold Cyber Ninjas Accountable, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (July 19, 2022), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/hold-cyber-ninjas-accountable [https://perma.cc/7QCL-SCLV].
61.
Jonathan J. Cooper, Cyber Ninjas Faces Fine over Arizona Election
Review Records, AP NEWS (Jan. 6, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/elections-lawsuitsarizona-phoenix-8417d871de10db020ee11e26ab28d03b
[https://perma.cc/A6XGXFLJ]; see also Cyber Ninjas, Inc. v. Kemp, No. CV-22-0055-SA (Ariz. Mar. 10, 2022)
(order denying special petition for interlocutory review of the contempt ruling); Mary Jo
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Although there remain obstacles to halting even such clear-cut legal
violations—witness the Ohio Supreme Court’s inability to bring the
Redistricting
Commission
into
compliance62—these
electoral
machinations are straightforwardly challenged under existing statutes and
doctrine.63
We focus here on more insidious efforts to undermine democracy
that may pose challenges for traditional adjudication. Consider, for
instance, a law that is facially neutral but deployed for antidemocratic
ends: state legislation that shifts authority from local to state actors, or
from one official to another, does not reveal itself as a partisan powergrab without attention to context.
Or consider the rash of audits, subpoenas, and threats of criminal
enforcement that co-opt traditional tools of law enforcement for
antidemocratic ends. These schemes can be difficult to challenge
precisely because they rely on, even as they invert, usual legal
approaches to election integrity and good government.
Although these and related attacks on democracy could readily
escape judicial review, the democracy principle provides a framework
through which courts should judge them. In Section A, we canvas several
emerging threats to the integrity of elections. Then, in Section B, we
explain how state courts might rely on the democracy principle to
evaluate such threats.

Pitzl, With Few Public Records Released, Arizona Supreme Court Keeps $50K in Daily
Fines
for
Cyber
Ninjas,
AZ
CENTRAL
(July
26,
2022,
6:33
PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2022/07/26/arizonasupreme-court-keeps-50-k-daily-fines-place-cyber-ninjas/10159054002/.
62.
The Ohio Supreme Court does not have authority to appoint a special
master to draw maps or to do so on its own, so the commission and legislature flouted its
orders and ran down the clock. See, e.g., Susan Tebben, Deadline for New Redistricting
Plan Comes Without Action, OHIO CAP. J. (June 3, 2022, 4:00 AM),
https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2022/06/03/deadline-for-new-redistricting-plan-comeswithout-action/ [https://perma.cc/V3XT-YUMY].
63.
In Wisconsin, for instance, a trial court judge held State Assembly Speaker
Robin Vos in contempt of court for failing to comply with orders to disclose documents.
See Am. Oversight v. Vos, No. 21-CV-2440, slip op. (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar.
30, 2022) (order and decision supporting the court’s contempt determination); see also
Am. Oversight v. Off. of Special Couns., No. 21-CV-3007 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty.
June 15, 2022) (holding the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) in contempt of a prior order
to search for and produce records and ordering the decision to be sent to the state Office
of Lawyer Regulation); see also Am. Oversight v. Off. of Special Couns., No. 21-CV3007 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. June 15, 2022) (order concluding that OSC had satisfied
conditions for purging contempt and calculating sanctions owed during the contempt
period). To the extent there may remain ambiguities in such cases, however, the
democracy principle may help resolve them. See, e.g., infra notes 147–62 and
accompanying text.
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A. Election Subversion
Since the 2020 presidential election, several troubling types of state
legislation have emerged. First, a number of states have adopted or are
considering power-shifting laws that would arrogate to the legislature or
its partisan designees new responsibilities for running elections or even
controlling their results.64 Second, many states have pursued or proposed
sham audits or investigations in order to destabilize and undermine faith
in elections.65 Third, numerous states have begun to criminalize aspects
of election administration in ways that harass and intimidate officials or
otherwise impede their ability to do their jobs.66
2. POWER-SHIFTING LEGISLATION
The first and most direct democratic threat comes from laws that
would arrogate to state legislatures the power to run elections—or even
the power to simply decide their results. At present, the most extreme of
these measures remain pending, without immediate prospect of passing.
In Arizona, H.B. 2476 would require the state’s two at-large presidential
electors to cast their votes for the candidate who received the highest
number of votes from the legislature, rather than the state’s popular
vote.67 Similarly, H.B. 2596 would add a new statutory provision
providing that the legislature “shall” call itself into special session to
review election results, shall accept or reject those results, and if it rejects
them, “any qualified elector may file an action in the superior court to
request that a new election be held.”68 Although these bills appear
unlikely to pass,69 they have already fueled proposals in other states.70
Moreover, less drastic versions of legislative arrogation have
already been enacted in the form of laws that require legislative approval
for various aspects of election administration. Montana and Kentucky
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.

H.B. 2476, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022).
H.B. 2596, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022).
See, e.g., Howard Fischer, Arizona’s Top House Republican: ‘I’m Not
Going to Kick (Voters) in the Teeth,’ TUCSON.COM, https://tucson.com/news/local/govtand-politics/arizonas-top-house-republican-im-not-going-to-kick-voters-in-theteeth/article_043eb976-8475-11ec-819c-47a5a455510d.html
[https://perma.cc/J48H43LX] (Apr. 21, 2022) (describing how Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers “has taken
the unprecedented step of assigning the proposal to each and every one of the 12 House
committees, saying he knows full well there is no way it can secure approval of each”).
70.
See, e.g., Reid J. Epstein, Wisconsin Republicans Push to Take Over the
State’s
Elections,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
19,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/us/politics/wisconsin-republicans-decertifyelection.html.
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now bar executive-branch officials from altering election procedures
absent the legislature’s approval.71 North Carolina’s S.B. 105 removes
the discretion of the State Board of Elections to enter into a consent
agreement with the courts regarding election matters.72 In Kansas, one
new law limits judicial and gubernatorial power to modify election
administration or procedures and bars the secretary of state from doing
so without approval from the state’s legislative coordinator council.73
Another Kansas law removes the secretary of state’s discretion to extend
the eadlyne for receipt of early ballots.74 In other states, scores of related
bills, assuming legislative power over longstanding electionadministration functions, have been proposed and are pending.75
A new law in Georgia takes a somewhat different tack toward a
similar end. It alters the structure of the State Elections Board in a way
that enhances legislative control by assigning the legislature power to
name the chair.76 The law then gives the Board authority to take over
election administration from local administrators.77 This may sound
innocuous (centralization of administration can, in some circumstances,
yield coordinated good-government ends), but here the partisan
opportunity for entrenchment is apparent. Indeed, “[t]he Board has
already begun the process of taking over election administration in Fulton

71.
H.B. 429, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021); S.B. 1, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021); see also After Veto Overrides, Beshear Sues Kentucky
Republican
Leaders
to
Maintain
Emergency
Powers,
WDRB.COM,
https://www.wdrb.com/news/coronavirus/after-veto-overridesbeshear%e2%80%a6mergency-powers/article_5ceb542a-65af-11eb-ac895381cd7838ec.html.
72.
S.B. 105, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. sec. 18.7.(c) (N.C. 2021).
73.
H.B. 2332, 2021–22 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
74.
H.B. 2183, 2021–22 Leg., Reg. Sess. sec. 7.(b) (Kan. 2021). Iowa, in a
similar vein, has removed the elections commissioner’s discretion to mail absentee ballots
to voters who did not request them, and vested that power with the legislature or
legislative council (and only during a declared public health disaster). See S.B. 413, 89th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021).
75.
See STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CTR., PROTECT DEMOCRACY & L.
FORWARD, supra note 2, at 17.
76.
Specifically, the law switches the secretary of state to an ex officio role and
replaces him with a chair chosen by the legislature. S.B. 202, 49th Leg., 156th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ga. 2021) (enacted).
77.
Id.
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County,”78 “the heavily Democratic population center of metro Atlanta
that Republicans blame for their statewide losses.”79
2. SHAM AUDITS
States have also been undermining elections by pursuing “sham
audits,”80 “bogus investigations,”81 and other baseless challenges to
election results. Open, rigorous audits can bolster public confidence and
ensure sound results.82 But in the wake of the 2020 election, we have
instead seen pretextual investigations and pursuit of conspiracy theories.
These audits invert the usual good-government ends of such practices:
they shake confidence in elections, disrupt election administration, and
intimidate election officials. They are causing professional, experienced
election administrators to quit in droves83 and to fear for their personal
safety.84 Insidiously, they do this under the banner of protecting the
78.
A Threat to Our Democracy: Election Subversion in the 2021 Legislative
Session, VOTING RTS. LAB (Sept. 29, 2021), https://votingrightslab.org/a-threat-to-our-

democracy-election-subversion-in-the-2021-legislative-session/ [https://perma.cc/HTC686RE]; see also, e.g., Mark Niesse, Prospect of Georgia Election Takeover Fuels
Concerns About Vote Integrity, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 23, 2021),
https://www.ajc.com/politics/prospect-of-georgia-election-takeover-fuels-concernsabout-vote-integrity/CFMTLFW6TZFH7O4LLNDZ3BY4NE/ [https://perma.cc/ET6ZBA9A].
79.
Mark Niesse, Georgia Bill Could Shift Power over Elections to GOP
Appointees,
ATLANTA
J.-CONST.
(Mar.
24,
2021),
https://www.ajc.com/politics/georgia-bill-would-shift-power-over-elections-to-gopappointees/VPNVO2W4TBBTFKGA7Z2GZIEQEE/ [https://perma.cc/2BVM-NRXS].
80.
Gowri Ramachandran, A Year Later—Sham Election Reviews Continue to
Undermine Democracy, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: EXPERT F. (Jan. 5, 2022),
https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/a-year-later-sham-election-reviews-continue-toundermine-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/Y4MR-RFYA].
81.
Hasen, supra note 1, at 277.
82.
See, e.g., AD HOC COMM. FOR 2020 ELECTION FAIRNESS AND LEGITIMACY,
FAIR ELECTIONS DURING A CRISIS: URGENT RECOMMENDATIONS IN LAW, MEDIA,
POLITICS, AND TECH TO ADVANCE THE LEGITIMACY OF, AND THE PUBLIC’S CONFIDENCE
IN,
THE
NOVEMBER
2020
U.S.
ELECTIONS
17
(Apr.
2020),
https://www.law.uci.edu/news/press-releases/2020/2020ElectionReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SL5-38Y2] (describing and recommending “risk-limiting audits” as
the best post-election auditing method).
83.
See, e.g., Michael Wines, After a Nightmare Year, Election Officials are
Quitting,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
2,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/politics/2020-election-voting-officials.html;
Miles Parks, 1 in 5 Local Election Officials Say They’re Likely To Quit Before 2024,
NPR (Mar. 10, 2022, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2022/03/10/1085425464/1-in-5local-election-officials-say-theyre-likely-to-quit-before-2024 [https://perma.cc/WK6DUXHD].
84.
See Wines, supra note 83 (“[O]ne in three officials said they felt unsafe in
the jobs.”); Parks, supra note 83 (noting that nearly one-fifth of respondents had received
threats and “more than half of them say they are worried about the safety of their
colleagues in future elections”).
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democratic system, co-opting the language of “election integrity”85 in the
service of election subversion.86
The link between this wave of audits and antidemocratic designs is
not subtle. The audits grew out of proposals by Trump loyalists seeking
to undermine the outcome of the presidential election.87 The nowinfamous memo by John Eastman proposed, among other things, that
state legislatures, “[t]aking the cue” from Vice President Mike Pence,
would “order a comprehensive audit/investigation of the election returns
in their states, and then determine whether the slate of electors initially
certified is valid, or whether the alternative slate of electors should be
certified by the legislature.”88 A group of U.S. senators likewise
proposed a pause on certifying the election for an audit and
reconsideration of state results.89 These early calls placed pressure on
Republican state officials to conduct baseless investigations.90 Over some
objections,91 this pressure prevailed in Arizona, Texas, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin and has gotten traction elsewhere,92 even as officials

85.
Courts have long recognized that, “[a] State indisputably has a compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process” and “in ensuring the order and
fairness of elections.” Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
214, 231–32 (1989) (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973)).
86.
See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 92
(2018) (“One of the great ironies of how democracies die is that the very defense of
democracy is often used as a pretext for its subversion.”).
87.
Ramachandran, supra note 80.
88.
READ: Trump Lawyer’s Full Memo on Plan for Pence to Overturn the
Election,
CNN
(Sept.
21,
2021,
5:47
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/21/politics/read-eastman-full-memo-pence-overturnelection/index.html [https://perma.cc/A84L-MXJ7].
89.
Joint Statement from Senators Cruz, Johnson, Lankford, Daines, Kennedy,
Blackburn, Braun, Senators-Elect Lummis, Marshall, Hagerty, Tuberville (Jan. 2, 2022),
https://www.cruz.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/joint-statement-from-senatorscruz-johnson-lankford-daines-kennedy-blackburn-braun-senators-elect-lummis-marshallhagerty-tuberville (“Congress should immediately appoint an Electoral Commission, with
full investigatory and fact-finding authority, to conduct an emergency 10-day audit of the
election returns in the disputed states. Once completed, individual states would evaluate
the Commission’s findings and could convene a special legislative session to certify a
change in their vote, if needed.”).
90.
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 1, at 277.
91.
See, e.g., Michael Wines, Arizona Vote Review Is ‘Political Theater’ and
‘Sham,’
G.O.P.
Leaders
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/us/arizona-audit-trump.html (Sept. 24, 2021)
(“The Republican leaders of Arizona’s most populous county issued a blistering rebuke
on Monday to a review of the November election that had been ordered by Republicans
in the State Senate, calling it ‘a grift disguised as an audit’ that had spun out of the
legislators’ control.”).
92.
See, e.g., STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CTR., PROTECT DEMOCRACY & L.
FORWARD, supra note 2, at 13–16.
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recognized they had no legal pathway to decertify the election.93 In
Wisconsin, for instance, although a statutory audit and hand recount
found no fraud in the 2020 election, former state supreme court justice
Michael Gableman (a Trump supporter who has called the 2020 election
stolen)94 led an audit initially supported by the state Assembly Speaker
that openly violated disclosure and subpoena rules.95
Gableman’s audit and others have been widely identified as shams
that lack the objectivity, transparency, and security of real audits.96 Yet
the damage even such circus-like affairs can do to public confidence is
real. Although the majority of Americans continue to believe that
elections are administered fairly,97 surveys from the past year repeatedly
show majorities within the Republican party who believe that ballots from
deceased or ineligible voters decided the 2020 presidential election,98 or
who say they will not trust the 2024 election.99 Indeed, the latter seems
to be the point: sham audits are designed to sow doubt about election

93.
See Alexander Shur, Robin Vos Claims Widespread Fraud, but Can’t
Decertify, After Meeting with Election Skeptics, MADISON.COM (Mar. 17, 2022),

https://madison.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/robin-vos-claims-widespread-fraudbut-cant-decertify-after-meeting-with-election-skeptics/article_7a0cba85-9639-5f1b81ff-a67071422b03.html [https://perma.cc/4QTA-BNBU].
94.
Patrick Marley, Michael Gableman Said Bureaucrats ‘Stole Our Votes’
Before He Was Put in Charge of Reviewing 2020 Election, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2021/08/09/michael-gableman-saidelection-stolen-before-put-charge-wisconsin-review/5518815001/
[https://perma.cc/7TKQ-RY2G] (Jan. 6, 2022, 3:56 PM).
95.
See supra note 63.
96.
See, e.g., Barry C. Burden & Trey Grayson, REPORT ON THE CYBER
NINJAS REVIEW OF THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL AND U.S. SENATORIAL ELECTIONS IN
MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA 1 (2021), https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/6.22.21-SUDC-Report-re-Cyber-Ninjas-Review-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NPY9-86L8]; Gowri Ramachandran & Matthew Germer, Bad-Faith
Election Audits Are Sabotaging Democracy Across the Nation, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/bad-faithelection-audits-are-sabotaging-democracy-across-nation
[https://perma.cc/2ZLZGWTW].
97.
See, e.g., Domenico Montanaro, Most Americans Trust Elections Are
Fair, but Sharp Divides Exist, a New Poll Finds, NPR (Nov. 1, 2021, 5:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/11/01/1050291610/most-americans-trust-elections-are-fairbut-sharp-divides-exist-a-new-poll-finds [https://perma.cc/VJP5-PRLB].
98.
See, e.g., Lane Cuthbert & Alexander Theodoridis, Do Republicans Really
Believe Trump Won the 2020 Election? Our Research Suggests That They Do, WASH.
POST:
MONKEY
CAGE
(Jan.
7,
2022,
7:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/07/republicans-big-lie-trump/
[https://perma.cc/39TL-3XSB] (reporting a finding from multiple polls that “only 21%
of Republicans say Joe Biden’s victory was legitimate”).
99.
See, e.g., Montanaro, supra note 97 (reporting that only approximately
one-third of Republicans surveyed stated that they would trust the 2024 election).
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outcomes rather than to ensure integrity.100 And now dozens of pending
or enacted statutes would authorize new audit powers for future
elections.101
3. CRIMINALIZING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
States are also adopting new criminal standards, election police
units, and other restrictions that serve to harass and chill election
officials. Most concerning are laws and bills that threaten election
administrators with criminal prosecution for efforts to facilitate voting or
otherwise carry out discretionary aspects of their work.
For example, a 2021 Arizona law makes it a felony offense for a
state or local election official to modify a filing date or other electionrelated deadline provided by statute unless ordered to by a court.102
While, superficially, this legislation simply requires compliance by
executive actors with state law, the threat of criminal prosecution is likely
to stop good-faith voter-access measures, such as efforts to facilitate
voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. A more recent Arizona law
creates another felony offense: failure by a county recorder to investigate
a voter-registration applicant’s citizenship status if that applicant is later
determined not to be a U.S. citizen.103 These new state felony laws are
likely not only to chill attempts by election officials to carry out discrete
responsibilities but also to deter civil servants from serving in election
administration positions.
Arizona is not alone in penalizing routine aspects of election
administration. Texas has made it a crime for a public official to modify
or suspend any election “standard, practice, or procedure mandated by
law or rule.”104 That same law also makes it a crime for early voting
clerks to facilitate mail voting by soliciting the submission of mail ballot
applications or distributing a mail ballot application to someone who did
not request one.105 A new law in Iowa has created criminal offenses and
enhanced penalties for election officials, including a felony for failing to
perform official duties and an aggravated misdemeanor for failing to

100. A collaboration of several voting-rights organizations has created a sham
audit-monitoring website born of the concern that the new wave of audits and auditauthorizing bills are “bad faith operations . . . aimed at undermining faith in our elections
and stoking the same conspiracy theories that led to the January 6 insurrection.” NOT AN
AUDIT, http://notanaudit.com [https://perma.cc/JSE2-K5PF] (last visited Oct. 10, 2022).
101. STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CTR., PROTECT DEMOCRACY & L. FORWARD,
supra note 2, at 13–14, 16.
102. H.B. 2794, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021) (enacted).
103. H.B. 2492, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022) (enacted).
104. S.B. 1, 87th Leg., 2d Special Sess. sec. 1.022 (Tex. 2021) (enacted).
105. Id. sec. 276.017.
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perform required voter list maintenance.106 And in Florida, a 2022 law
creates a new “Office of Election Crimes and Security,” as well as more
funding for election-related investigations by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement.107 Because the legislature and governor introduced no
evidence of significant voting fraud that this criminal approach would
deter, critics understand the measure as a way to impose “additional
barriers to voting” that particularly “target[] communities of color.”108
Beyond criminalizing electoral administration, other recent
measures impose burdensome requirements on election administrators.
Some states are considering bills that would, unworkably, prohibit the
use of electronic tabulation and require ballots to be counted by hand,109
or that would impose chain of custody requirements that sound in good
governance but are “excessive, infeasible, and disruptive to the
administration of elections.”110 Many others have adopted laws that
prohibit local election officials from relying on private donations to
conduct elections.111 A number of these laws extend to voter education,
106.
107.
108.

S.B. 413, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021) (enacted).
See S.B. 524, 2022 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2022) (enacted).
Gary Fineout, DeSantis Signs Bill Creating One of the Nation’s Only
Election
Police
Units,
POLITICO
(Apr.
25,
2022,
5:22
PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/25/desantis-florida-election-police-units00027577 [https://perma.cc/4AWB-9TG4] (highlighting a statement from Rep. Yvonne
Hayes Hinson); see also, e.g., S.B. 441, 156th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2022)
(enacted) (charging the Georgia Bureau of Investigations with identifying and
investigating potential violations of election law).
109. See, e.g., H.B. 2710, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022); H.B. 2596,
55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022); H.B. 2743 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022);
S.B. 1338, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022); S.B. 1348, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2022); H.B. 1204, 73d Gen. Assemb. 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2022); H.B. 2633,
101st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2022); H.B. 1064, 2022 Sess. (N.H. 2022);
H.B. 1778, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2022); H.B. 2115, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2022); H.B. 3233, Reg. Sess. (W.V. 2021); Holly Ramer & Christina A.
Cassidy, Some in GOP Want Ballots to be Counted by Hand, Not Machines, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2022, 10:17 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-0312/gop-legislation-ballots-hand-count-machines [https://perma.cc/M9FU-7SRV]; see
also Rosalind S. Helderman, Amy Gardner & Emma Brown, How Trump Allies Are
Pushing to Hand-Count Ballots Around the U.S., WASH. POST. (Apr. 4, 2022, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/04/trump-hand-counted-ballotsdominion-machines/ [https://perma.cc/P6QX-M74F] (“Experts say hand-counting
ballots is so impractical that, if adopted, election results would be thrown into
unimaginable chaos, inviting mass human error and delaying results—and potentially
giving bad actors more time to slow or even block certification.”).
110. Interference with Election Administration: Defining the Problem, VOTING
RTS.
LAB,
https://tracker.votingrightslab.org/election-interference-definitions
[https://perma.cc/687V-TUTU] (last visited October 10, 2022).
111. E.g., H.B. 194, 2022 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2022); H.B. 2183, 2021 Reg. Sess.
(Kan. 2021); H.B. 301, 2022 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2022) (enacted); H.B. 1365, 2022 Reg.
Sess. (Miss. 2022); H.B. 3046, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2022); S.B. 122, 97th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2022); S.B. 1534, 112th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2021).
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outreach, and registration, and some make acceptance of such private
funding to conduct elections a felony or misdemeanor.112 Although this
legislation may seem innocuous or beneficial—shouldn’t elections be
funded by the public fisc instead of private largesse?—by prohibiting use
of such resources without guaranteeing adequate public funding for
election administration, these laws impede election officials’ ability to do
their jobs.

B. The Democracy Principle at Work
What can be done about the sort of measures canvassed above? One
salient characteristic of these measures is their veneer of legality. Not
only are many adopted in the form of law—as normal legislation rather
than rogue state action—but they also purport to require compliance with
legal standards or to guarantee regularity and consistency in election
administration. As power-shifting legislation, audits, and criminal
measures advertise their fealty to law, however, they threaten the
franchise and electoral integrity, as well as nonpartisan, expert election
administration.
Although such measures may be difficult to challenge in federal
court, state courts are well positioned to judge them, and the democracy
principle provides a framework through which they might do so. After
describing the distinctive role state courts play in American democracy,
we begin to sketch how the democracy principle might bear on the new
election subversion.
2. THE DISTINCTIVE ROLE OF STATE COURTS
Viewed through the lens of federal litigation, many of the threats
described above may not seem amenable to judicial resolution. To begin,
federal courts are institutionally constrained. The familiar “countermajoritarian difficulty”113 might compel federal courts to stay their hand
in sensitive electoral disputes, especially those involving state laws given
that states possess their own sovereignty.114 Federal courts may also find
themselves substantively constrained, short on federal constitutional
resources to resolve such disputes. And federal courts are jurisdictionally
constrained, bound by Article III and precedent to hear only certain types

112. E.g., H.B. 301 (Ky. 2022); H.B. 194 (Ala. 2022).; H.B. 2183 (Kan.
2021); H.B. 3046 (Okla. 2022).
113. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed., Yale University Press 1986) (1962).
114. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1899–1901 (2001).

2022:1337

Countering the New Election Subversion

1357

of cases and controversies and to forgo a more synoptic common-law
role.115
Whatever the precise scope of these limits on federal courts, the
state judicial role is markedly broader. State courts have long adjudicated
cases that are politically fraught, that require distinguishing good from
bad faith, and that call for a common-law eye for context and facts.
Illustrative is state courts’ approach to partisan gerrymandering after the
Supreme Court’s insistence in Rucho v. Common Cause116 that federal
courts had neither authority nor legal standards to direct them in
adjudicating such claims.117 Both recently and in the more distant past,
state courts have recognized their role in fostering democracy. Their
institutional, substantive, and jurisdictional differences from their federal
counterparts place the new election subversion comfortably before them.
First, state courts are institutionally distinct from federal courts. The
vast majority are elected.118 While the systems of election vary across
states, they share a commitment to keep judges connected to the people
of the state. That is by design. Although there were many reasons, some
ill-conceived, that reformers shifted to elective judiciaries,119 one
prominent justification was that elections would make judges more
accountable to the people.120 Available convention records underscore the
link between judicial elections and the state constitutional principle of
popular sovereignty. At the Wisconsin Convention, for example,
proponents of judicial elections argued that appointed judges were too
“dependen[t] upon the other two branches of government,” whereas an
elective judiciary would fulfill “an axiom of government in this country,
that the people are the source of all political power, and to them should
their officers and rules be responsible for the faithful discharge of their

115. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
ORDER (1991).
116. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019)
117. See id. at 2507; Adams v. DeWine, Nos. 2021-1428 & 2021-1449, 2022
WL 129092, at *7 (noting that the concerns the Supreme Court raised about federal courts
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims do not apply to state courts).
118. Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significantfigures [https://perma.cc/WMS7-YFJR] (Oct. 4, 2021).
119. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 717 (1995) (“Marbury, Jacksonianism,
participation in politics by settlers of the western frontier, judicial rulings favorable to
creditors, resistance to the English common law, and judicial corruption are all
overlapping factors frequently mentioned by scholars (Jacksonianism most of all) as
contributing to the adoption of elective judiciaries.”); Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of
Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 190–93, 224 (1993).
120. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 272 (2012).
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respective duties.”121 Even the minority of states that appoint judges
retain a closer link to the people by using time-limited terms rather than
life tenure.122 Nor are state courts institutionally bound to defer to a
subsidiary sovereign. Despite important appeals to the values of localism,
there is no analogous intrastate judicial system that counsels state courts
to stay their hands in favor of local adjudication.123
Second, state courts interpret constitutions in which democracy is a
structural, orienting value. As described in Part I, the democracy
principle distinguishes state constitutions from the federal Constitution.
The arguments against constitutional “lockstepping,” in which state
courts reflexively follow federal decisions when interpreting their own
state constitutions,124 apply with special force in the context of democracy
and elections. Historically and in recent years, state courts have indeed
been attuned to their own distinctive constitutional provisions and
traditions.125
Finally, state courts have different jurisdictional limits and a broader
portfolio of work than the federal courts. Early state courts played an
overt role in policymaking, with influential judges like James Kent
viewing themselves “as a member of the policymaking branch of
government, not just an interpreter of its work.”126 Even as the state
judicial role has come to look more like the federal role, there remain
important differences. Many state courts perform functions—ranging
from attorney discipline and “problem-solving” in specialized criminal
courts to the drawing of legislative districts—that blur lines between the
branches.127 Even in their judicial function, state courts lack Article III
constraints, typically adopting only narrow and prudential jurisdictional

121. Croley, supra note 119, at 717 n.86 (quoting report of the Judiciary
Committee of the Wisconsin Constitutional Convention).
122. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 118.
123. See Hershkoff, supra note 114, at 1901–03.
124. See, e.g., JEFFREY SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174 (2018); William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
125. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 7, at 910–12, 925–26; supra
Section I.B.
126. Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the
Collaborative Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REV. 712, 740 (2018).
127. Michael C. Pollack, Courts Beyond Judging, 46 BYU L. REV. 719, 753
(2021).
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limits.128 Many issue advisory opinions.129 And they decidedly remain
common law courts. In that capacity, state courts not only “play an
accepted policymaking role in a broad range of complex areas,”130 but
often bring common-law sensibilities and methodologies into their
constitutional interpretation—taking close account of context and
circumstances in their rulings.131 They should do just that when
confronted with the new election subversion.
2. SOME EXAMPLES
State courts are well positioned to review the sorts of power-shifting
legislation, sham audits, and intimidation described above. Of course,
any given case will turn on the specific facts and law involved; to the
extent litigation proceeds under state constitutions, it will also necessarily
demand attention to the particular text, history, and doctrinal
understandings of the state constitution at issue. By invoking a trans-state
democracy principle, we do not mean to undermine state-specific
approaches or a focus on distinct facts and circumstances. We do,
though, suggest that the democracy principle helps inform
understandings of specific constitutional provisions and that state courts
should attend to popular sovereignty, majority rule, and political equality
as they encounter the new election subversion.
Begin with what should be a simple case under any instantiation of
the democracy principle: a law, such as Arizona’s proposed H.B. 2476,
that would arrogate to a state legislature the people’s power to decide
elections.132 Legislation that empowers the legislature to control election
results is anathema to principles of popular sovereignty, majority rule,
and political equality. It violates enforceable guarantees contained in
forty-nine state constitutions that locate political power in the people
themselves rather than in state government bodies.133 For instance,
128. See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR & CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME
COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 42–45 (1993); see also, e.g., Village of Trempealeau v.
Mikrut, 681 N.W.2d 190, 192–93 (Wis. 2004) (“Circuit courts in Wisconsin are
constitutional courts with general original subject matter jurisdiction over ‘all matters
civil and criminal.’ Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8. Accordingly, a circuit court is never
without subject matter jurisdiction.”).
129. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 128, at 43–44.
130. Hershkoff, supra note 114, at 1837.
131. See Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 MICH.
L. REV. 1537, 1565 (2019) (discussing state courts’ contextual, case-by-case approach in
cases involving state agency independence); Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and
Incompletely Theorized State Constitutional Decision-Making, 77 MISS. L.J. 265, 306
(2007) (positing that state courts “treat constitutional law as a species of common law”).
132. H.B. 2476, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022).
133. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737,
803 (Pa. 2018); supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
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Arizona’s constitution states: “All political power is inherent in the
people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed.”134 Such legislation likewise undermines the right of suffrage
guaranteed in each of the fifty states and the attendant guarantees of free
elections.135 Arizona’s constitution, for example, provides: “All elections
shall be free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time
interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”136
Elsewhere, the state constitution emphasizes the role of the people,
through majority rule, to choose their government: “In all elections held
by the people in this state, the person, or persons, receiving the highest
number of legal votes shall be declared elected.”137 Taken together, these
and related provisions demand popular majority rule by political equals—
and belie the claim that anyone other than voters may decide elections.
The fact that the state legislature is seeking to arrogate this power
to itself makes such proposals still more egregious. A line running
through the development of state constitutions is the aim of “preventing
faithless legislators from frustrating the popular will.”138 From term
limits to detailed procedural requirements, state constitutions have been
amended over time to ensure legislative accountability to the public and
to limit the legislature’s authority. In states including Arizona, the people
have also retained a portion of the legislative power for themselves
through the initiative and referendum.139 The tradition of state
constitutional amendment and interpretation exemplifies the broader
constitutional resistance to treating the state legislature as the voice of the
people, especially when the people may speak in less mediated forms.
Given the myriad ways in which state constitutions seek to vindicate
popular sovereignty against legislative aggrandizement, it is simply not
plausible that the legislature could constitutionally wrest from the people
their electoral power.140
134. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.
135. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. Arizona’s suffrage
provision has the most indirect framing, but it qualifies voters who meet eligibility
requirements. ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
136. ARIZ. CONST. art II, § 21.
137. Id. art. VII, § 7.
138. Tarr, supra note 20, at 94.
139. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“[T]he people reserve the power to propose
laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject such laws and amendments
at the polls, independently of the legislature; and they also reserve, for use at their own
option, the power to approve or reject at the polls any act, or item, section, or part of
any act, of the legislature.”).
140. This state constitutional tradition also renders particularly problematic the
independent state legislature claim some are advancing, see supra note 6, insofar as it
would define state legislatures as bodies free from state constitutions rather than
constituted by them. Since the late eighteenth century—and in the decades since as new
states have joined the Union and state constitutions have been amended and replaced
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State courts also have both tools and authority to address subtler and
more indirect forms of legislative arrogation. Take the Georgia law that
alters the State Elections Board’s composition and authority.141 The
backdrop of its enactment was Georgia’s dramatic role in the 2020
presidential election, in which Republican Secretary of State Brad
Raffensperger refused to “find” enough votes to allow Trump to
fraudulently claim victory.142 The concentrated partisan control of the
Board, and the potential deployment of the Board to displace entire slates
of local election officials with new partisan “superintendents,” should
not be lost on a state court obligated to enforce the state constitution’s
commitment to democracy.
That the Georgia legislature has consolidated power in the State
Elections Board by stripping power from the secretary of state deepens
these concerns. One way state constitutions have indirectly constrained
“faithless legislators” is by providing for popular election of executive
actors who can accordingly “claim that they ha[ve] just as strong a
connection to the people, the source of all political authority, as d[o]
legislators.”143 In Georgia, the secretary of state is one of many executive
officials elected statewide by popular majority vote, and he or she
accordingly has the sort of democratic mandate and direct connection to
voters constitutional reformers contemplated.144 We do not suggest that
election administration must always be the purview of separately elected
officials.145 But for the state legislature to not only remove the Secretary
of State’s authority, but also assign it to a chair chosen by the legislature
itself flouts the constitution’s approach to distributed power. In Georgia
and other states that have recently altered the roles of election officials,
state courts should take a hard look at changes to election administration,
asking whether such changes have a legitimate basis other than partisan

outright—state legislatures have been both empowered and constrained by state
constitutions in the service of popular sovereignty. Nothing in the federal Constitution
frees these legislatures from state constitutional bounds or empowers federal judges to
override the will of the people of the state. See generally Vikram David Amar & Akhil
Reed Amar, Eradicating Bush-League Arguments Root and Branch: The Article II
Independent-State-Legislature Notion and Related Rubbish, 2021 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Leah
M. Litman & Katherine Shaw, Textualism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Independent
State Legislature Theory, 2022 WIS. L. REV. 1235; Carolyn Shapiro, The Independent
State Legislature Claim, Textualism, and State Law, 90 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4047322; Hayward H.
Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 731 (2001).
141. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
142. Gellman, supra note 1.
143. Tarr, supra note 20, at 94.
144. See GA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
145. See Seifter, supra note 8 (manuscript at 35–37).
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efforts to consolidate power and considering as evidence disruptions to
distributed democratic power within the state.
The democracy principle also bears on the sham audits described
above. Most narrowly, when challenges under specific statutory or
constitutional provisions are raised—for instance, that the audit violates
state contracting requirements or open-records rules—the democracy
principle can play a supporting role, bolstering existing state-law
principles and providing a canon of construction to guide close cases.
The Arizona and Wisconsin audits described above are already the
subject of legal challenges concerning state public records laws and
misuse of subpoenas,146 but litigation is ongoing, and far more is at stake
than technical violations.
For instance, the Arizona Supreme Court recently decided that
legislative privilege shielded many (but not all) legislative
communications in connection with the “Cyber Ninjas” audit.147
Although this ruling is contestable under state public records law itself—
Arizona public records law presumptively favors disclosure, its doctrines
cabin legislative privilege, and the court of appeals held the privilege
inapplicable148—the democracy principle could have informed the court’s
analysis. The circumstances reveal that the audit was an attempt to
subvert, not strengthen, the integrity of state election administration, so
any close questions should be resolved in favor of public access and
against legislative efforts to shield documents from the people.149 So too,
the democracy principle might have informed the Wisconsin attorney
general’s litigation about the Gableman audit’s misuse of subpoenas. The
problem is not just that the subpoenas lacked some of the formalities of
authentic legal documents; it is that they were baseless and targeted to
undermine election administration.150
Although the democracy principle has a role to play as a canon of
construction in close cases governed by distinct state-law statutes or
doctrines, the remedies imposed in such cases may be limited: a court
might require disclosure or quash subpoenas, or it might invalidate
impermissible contracts in ways that the legislature can simply cure.151
In other cases, the democracy principle and the state constitutional
provisions that undergird it may bear directly on the controversy and
146. See supra notes 61, 63 and accompanying text.
147. See Fann v. Kemp, 253 P.3d 1275, 1287 (Ariz. 2022).
148. See, e.g., Fann v. Kemp, 505 P.3d 301, 307 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022) (“A
public official bears the burden of overcoming the presumption favoring disclosure.”).
149. Instead, the court purported to stay its hand, stating that the electorate, not
the courts, must “serve as the ultimate arbiters of the wisdom of any legislative action.”
Fann, 253 515 P.3d at 1287. While adopting the language of democracy, such statements
undervalue the judicial role in enforcing the constitutional democracy principle.
150. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 63.
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furnish a stronger remedy that precludes the illegitimate activity. A court
might conclude that the sort of sham audits we described above violate
constitutional provisions guaranteeing popular sovereignty, political
equality, and majority rule.152
For example, the Georgia Constitution states that “[a]ll government,
of right, originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and
is instituted solely for the good of the whole. Public officers are the
trustees and servants of the people and are at all times amenable to
them.”153 The state supreme court has already applied this clause to
invalidate statutes that attempted to vest in private entities the
appointment to public commissions, relying on the idea that
“[f]undamental principles embodied in our constitution dictate that the
people control their government.”154 Election audits by unaccountable
figures do not comport with a requirement that the public retain some
control of key government functions.
So too, such audits may violate state constitutional provisions
concerning suffrage and elections that partially compose the democracy
principle. For example, Arizona requires both that “[a]ll elections shall
be free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time
interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage,”155 and that
“[t]here shall be enacted registration and other laws to secure the purity
of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.”156 We
should expect proponents of sham audits to defend them as securing “the
purity of elections.”157 But state courts have already proven capable of
distinguishing efforts to maintain integrity from efforts to erode it.158 The
Arizona Supreme Court recently rejected “election integrity” as a blanket
justification for state preemption of local authority to set municipal

152. In some cases, this conclusion might follow from statutes requiring
generous construction of provisions to favor voters. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 5.01(1) (2019–
20) (“Except as otherwise provided, chs. 5 to 12 shall be construed to give effect to the
will of the electors, if that can be ascertained from the proceedings, notwithstanding
informality or failure to fully comply with some of their provisions.”).
153. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
154. Delay v. Sutton, 818 S.E.2d 659, 661 (Ga. 2018) (rejecting law vesting
appointment of DeKalb County Board of Ethics in private entities); see also, e.g., Rogers
v. Med. Ass’n, 259 S.E.2d 85, 87 (Ga. 1979) (noting that state “constitutional provisions
mandate that public affairs shall be managed by public officials who are accountable to
the people”).
155. ARIZ. CONST. art. II., § 21.
156. Id. art. VII, § 12.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., PAC, 29 So. 3d
1053, 1057 (Fla. 2010) (rejecting argument that new “politically charged counter-petition
revocation campaigns” for ballot initiatives were necessary for ballot integrity).
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election dates.159 Citing a long line of cases, the court concluded that
“election integrity generally refers to fair and honest election-related
procedures, which are necessary to ensure voters’ trust,” and not simply
any election-related measure that a state sees fit to assert.160 The same
could easily be said of an audit like the “Cyber Ninjas” one in Arizona.
These provisions and understandings likewise provide a basis for
state courts to invalidate laws that threaten election officials with criminal
prosecution for efforts to facilitate voting or otherwise carry out their
duties. Such measures not only burden the right to vote and interfere with
free and open elections but also pretextually invoke the coercive power
of the state. Complementing the text and history we have described
above, many state constitutions express particular concern with
criminalizing participation in elections. More than half of the states—
including most that have been adopting new felony and misdemeanor
offenses around election administration—expressly protect voters from
arrest during their attendance at or travel to or from an election. For
example, Arizona’s Constitution states: “Electors shall in all cases,
except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at any election, and in going thereto and returning
therefrom.”161 Although such provisions do not directly speak to
criminalizing election administration, they do reflect a more pervasive
concern with using the state’s power of criminal enforcement to
undermine free elections. In distinct clauses that protect free and equal
or free and fair elections, for example, state constitutions also frequently
prohibit the use of civil or military powers to interfere with the right of
suffrage.162 As the Arizona Court of Appeals noted in construing this
provision consistently with other states’ understandings, free and equal
elections require that voters “not be prevented from casting a ballot by
intimidation or threat of violence, or any other influence that would deter
the voter from exercising free will.”163 Intimidation and threats directed
at election administrators, as well as at voters, can likewise undermine
free and open elections.

159. State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 484 P.3d 624, 631–32 (Ariz.
2021).
160. See id. at 631; see also Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992)
(rejecting argument that local public financing undermines election integrity).
161. ARIZ. CONST. art VII, § 4.
162. E.g., id. art. II, § 21 (“All elections shall be free and equal, and no power,
civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of
suffrage.”).
163. Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 407 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (“Other states
with similar constitutional provisions have generally interpreted a ‘free and equal’
election as one in which the voter is not prevented from casting a ballot by intimidation
or threat of violence, or any other influence that would deter the voter from exercising
free will, and in which each vote is given the same weight as every other ballot.”).
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Especially considered together, as the democracy principle instructs,
provisions guaranteeing popular sovereignty and the people’s control
over government, free and equal elections, and both general and specific
forms of legislative accountability suggest a powerful state constitutional
case against power-shifting legislation, sham audits, and pretextual
criminalization—and one state courts are well equipped to evaluate in
specific cases.
CONCLUSION
American democracy faces many threats. Some, like political
violence that targets elections, directly attack the rule of law.164 Yet one
insidious possibility is that election subversion will come from within the
legal system, not outside of it, and that it will co-opt the vocabulary and
instruments of law, not reject them outright.165 Already, state legislatures
and officials are adopting power-shifting bills, audits, and criminal
penalties for election administrators that present as lawful, even lawenhancing, measures. More such legislation can be expected.
Whatever the limits of federal courts when it comes to reviewing
these measures, state courts have ample resources to engage with—and
to counter—the new election subversion. The democracy principle in
state constitutions commits states to popular sovereignty, majority rule,
and political equality. The textual provisions, structural guarantees, and
historical developments that inform the principle in each of the fifty states
make state constitutional law a significant, if underappreciated, resource
for combatting electoral threats. Indeed, the democracy principle
underscores that state courts have not only the authority but also the duty
to invalidate election-subverting measures and to serve as a bulwark for
the basic functioning of American democracy.

164. See, e.g., NATHAN P. KALMOE & LILLIANA MASON, RADICAL AMERICAN
PARTISANSHIP: MAPPING VIOLENT HOSTILITY, ITS CAUSES, AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR
DEMOCRACY 13, 36–37 (2022); Rachel Kleinfeld, The Rise of Political Violence in the
United States, 32 J. OF DEMOCRACY 160, 163–64, 172 (2021).
165. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 1; Issacharoff, supra note 57, at 36–38;
Scheppele, supra note 5.

